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CHAPTER I

THE BASIC PHIWSOPHY
OF'1 JOHN DEWEY
_ _ ...__ ' ... 4.

*
This chapter will confine itself to a presentation of John
Dewey·s philosophy and will make no attempt to evaluate it.
This task will be reserved for Chapter VII •
• or a clear understanding of his philosophy, lt might be
well to start by presentlng

~

picture of -classloal- philo-

sophy and the oharacter of its shortcomings as he conceives
them.

He argues that this philosophy was the aCCidental out-

come of the antecedent experiences of primitive man in trying
to adjust himself to a world of alien forces.

!hese anteoe-

dent forces beoame fixed in W1ths and religious praotioes whioh
were then later transformed by the Greeks into the 10gioa1 forma
of philosophy, creating the two oategories of Kind and MAtter,
!heory and Praotioe,

•

Primitive man who lived in a world of peril sought security in two ways: (1) By inventing arts - PRACTICE.

He made

utensils and tools, built shelter, wove garments, used fire,
planted fields, established associated life, etc. (2)
pi tiating the powers whioh surrounded him - !H&ORY.

By

pro-

He made

supplioations, offered sacrifioe, performed ceremonial rites,

engaged in maglc cults. eto.
Slnce practloe dealt wlth the ordlnary and theory wlth the
extraordinary, praotioe was felt to be tnferlor to theory.

PRACTICE
Thought is uncertain as judgment and belief 1n matters of
action and oan never atta1n more than a precarious probabi11ty.
It deals w1th individualized and unique sltuations whioh Involve ohange. 1n Whioh the plans of man are subjeot to frustration by alien foroes.
THEORY

!hought deals w1th oertainty; for through thought lt was
oonsid •• ed posslble to hope for self-transcendency ln the grasp
of universal Be1ng and thus have the oonsolatlon of certa1nty
whioh 1s not entangled with wavering fortunes of the overt aot.
In the early history of man this assurance was provlded by

myths and rellgious beliefs.
Phl10soPDT, as a Greek oreation, inherited this realm
whioh iellglon and lfyths had been conoern:ed wlth ,and the form
oeased to be that of the story told ln imag1native and emot10nal style and became that of ratlonal disoourse oDservable
to the canons of 10glc.

the geometry of Buolld doubtlessly'

gave the ,Greeks thelr c lew to 10g10.

!hls' along wl th the

elimlnatlon of grosser auperstitions made posslble the ldeaa
of aolenoe and a llfe of reason.
oonceptlon of the two

o.~.goeles

this attltude f1xed the
of reallty - ohange and flxed

--------------------------------------------.
reallty.

~~

1.

-

!HE~~,_~~

PRACTICAL ACTIVITY (Change) is empirleal, par-

.

tlcular, materlal, , probable, and contingent;
in which practical
.
I:

judgment attempts an understanding to deal wlth an inferior
region of belng in Which change rules and in which the resultlng
product is only BELrEr and the most that oan be asserted is
that things are "so and so· upon the whole, usually.
2.

THE REALM OF TRUE BEING (Fixed Reallty) is thought, univer-

sal, immaterlal, certain, and self-sufflcient; in which the
office of knowledge is concerned with the disclosure of the Reali
ln itself, of Being in and of itself. and produoe.KNOVlI.EmE
J

Which to be certain must relate to that Which has antecedent
existence or essent1al Belng.,What is known 1s antecedent to
the mental act of observat10n and inqu1ry.
In th1s manner Greek

ph110sop~

f1xed the bas1c pattern of

man's quest for c erta1nty through knowledge.
"the perfect and complete is rational thought, the
ultimate ·end" or terminus of all natural movement.
!hat which changes, which becomes and passes away.
is material; change defines the physical. At most
and beat, it 1s a potentiality of r.aohing a stable
and fixed end. !o these two realms belong two
sorts of knowledge. One of them i8 alone knowledge
in the full sense, sOience. this has a rational,
neoessary and unchanging for~. It is oertain.
!he oth.r, dealing with change is belief or opin1on;
empirical and partioular; lt 1s cont1ngent, a matter
of probab1lity, not of o.rta1nty •••• • 1.

1. »ewey; !he Quest for Oertaintl •. p. 20.

~~----------------------------------------~
This frcllIleviOrk of philosophic thought later became embedded in

Christian Theology and through revelation and reason, formed
the basic pattern for philosophic thought until the scientific
revolution of the 17th centur.y.

It is said that one can find

in Greek philosophical efforts the embryonic character of all
modern patterns of philosophioal thought.

But aside from such

a faot it can be said that the abiding Greek philosophy of a
more enduring and persistent charaoter was that of Plato and
Aristotle, in whioh there was a division of mind and matter.
theory and praotice, an inferior order and a superior order, a
lower and a higher reality, knowledge and belief, change and
permanency, knowledge and aotion.

It was this organization

with whioh John Dewey finds fault and whioh the scientific revolution oame into conflict with.

THE SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTION
(What it was and what its effects were on philosophy)
The soientific revolution of the 17th oentury effected a
great modifioation of this system of olassioal philosophy by
carrying the scheme of demonstrative knowledge through mathematics over to natural objects which gave it a validity that
produced a rivalry between spiritual values, guaranteed by the
older philosophies, and the conclusions of natural soience.
A mathematical science of nature couched in mechanistic terms
claimed to be the only sound natural philosophy.

~~~----------------------~----------~
"The work 6f Galileo was not a development, but s
revolution. It marked a change from the qualitative
to thequantit*tive or metrio; from the heterogeneous to the homogeneous; from intrinsic forms to
relations; from esthetic harmonies to mathematical
formulae; from contemplative enjoyment to active
manipulation and control; from rest to change; from
eternal objects to temporal sequence. The idea of
a two-realm scheme persisted for moral and· religious
purposes; it vanished for purposes of natural soience." 2.

Bence the older philosophies lost alliance with the natural
knowledge and support that had been given to philosophy by them.
Philosopn, then made an effort to solve this conflict

o~

in-

terests by a succession of theories regarding the nature of
knowledge, some of which are as follows:

SPINOZA
Be thought to obtain from science a conclusive demonstration of the perfection of Belng.
mind.

Nature was to be one with

There was in his philosophi a complete interdependence

of all things according to universal and necessary

law-~an

idea

which he found to be the basis of natural science 3. and the
goodness of Nature was attributed to God.
r

fhe experimental trend of SCience, as distinct from its
mathematical strain; was in conflict with Spinozs's unquestioned faith that the logioal order and oonneotion of ideas is
one with the order and connection of existence.

The same

weakness would hold in the case of the philosophy of DESCARTES
2•

.!lli.

i.

!!!!!"

p. 95.
pp. 54 & 65.

---------------------------------------------------------------,
attempted to find the locus of absolute oertainty in math~o

ematical terms within the knowing mind.
~

!he philosopbT of Kant was a further attempt to reconcile
the idea that the realm of ends and values authoritative for
conduct was that of the revealed will of God; and in which the
olaims of reason are supreme with that of the knowledge of
nature.

)'or this purpose he made a two-fold division of terri-

tor.y between the objects of cognitive certainty and those of
equally complete moral assurance.

Hls failure was to

80

show

successfully how these two fields could have a natural basis
of contact and

interaotion~

HERBERT SPENCER

Ris doctrine that universal evolution is the highest principle
of the physical world-is just another phase in seeking certainty - Good in reality - towards whiohthe evolution is
moving.
John Dewey oites the theories of these philosophers, among
others, to show that oonfliot and oonfusion are the inevitable
results of the division .ofthe world, into two kinds· of Being,
one superior, aooessible only to reason and ideal in nature,
the other inferior, material, ohangeable, accessib.le to sense
observationa.

In the former oase knowledge is contemplative

and in the latter it is operative.

this situation as the re-

sult of an historical acoident has led philosophy into endles8 oonfusion and fruitless aotivity,

8S

well as an .mpasse

· GoaDeotlon with the modern findings of acienoe.'

'0 re-

.••~.ilish itself philosophy must reoonstruct itself on the
,asis of rationalizing the possibilities of experience; in
other words it must become operative and experimental.
~'he division of the world into two kinds of Being.
one superior, acoessible only to reason and ideal
in nature, the other inferior. material, changeable, empirical, acoessible to sense-observation,
turns inevitably into the idea that knowledge is
oontemplative in nature. It assumes a contrast
between theory and practioe which was all to the
dlsadvantage of the latter. But in the ,aotual
oourse of the development of sOienoe, a tremendous
change has come about. When the praotice of knowledge oeased to be dialeotioal and became experi.
mental, knowing became pre-occupied with changes
and the test of knowledge became the ability to
bring about certain ohanges. Knowing, for the
experimental scienoes, means a certain kind of
intelligently oonduoted doing; it oeases to be
oontemplative and beoomes in a true sense praotioal. Bow this implies that philosophy, unless
it is to undergo a oomplete break with the authorized spirit of sOience, must also alter its
nature. It must assume a praotioal nature; it
must become operative and expertmental.-*~hilosophioally speaking, this is the great differenoe involved in the ohange from knowledge and
philosophy as oontemplative to.pperative. !he
ohange does not mean the lowers'in dignity of
philosophy from a lofty plane to one of gross
utilitarianism. It signifies that the prime function of philosophy ls that of rationalizing the
pOssibilities of experience, espeoiallf oolleotive
human experience." 4.

Iewton claimed to have arrived at his sOience empirio ally ,
but being influenced by the intellectual oonceptions of olassioal philosophy, he postulated mass, time, spaoe, and motion
absolutes.

a8

He arrived at this position of establiShing these

• Dewey; Reoonstruction in Philosopbl, p. 122.

. ...,iservables by means of rea·s:on'iD.g from observable data and
not by methods in keeping with experimental science.
As a consequence, Binstein. in looking for a hypothesis
~o

explain the empirical results of the )(J.chelson-Korley exper-

iment on light, undermined Newton's position in regard to absolutes.

the discovery of the Heisenberg's principle of "in-

determinancy" further weakened the possibility of Science
d.aling with unchangeable substance having properties fixed in
isolation and unaffected by interaction.
~eisenberg's principle compels a recognition of the
fact that interaotion prevents an aocurate measurement of velocity and position for an body. the
demonstration oentering about the 1'0 e of the interaction of the observer in determining what actually
happens." 5.

l

showed that if we fix, metrically, velocity, then
is a range of indeterminateness in the assignment of position, and vice-versa. When one is fixed
the other is defined only within a specified limit
of probability. The element of indeterminateness is
not connected with defect in the method of observation but is intrinsic." 6.
~8

the~e

Ihe importance for John Dewey of these two advances of scient!f
~eor.r,

is that they show in science at least. that the idea of

aisolutes in classical philosophy
cannot be the objects of
,moWing.

Science on the ,o-th-er hand makes progress through know-

tng the operations of fixed relations in the element of change
1a phenomena.

It has accomplished this by not studying things in their
~ualitative" aspects but by reducing them to

, Dtd,

-,. .

I. Iiid

p. 202.
p 203

!!!! and

rr~onsiderins tht:nji ••
,

termini of natural "events."

"by 'data' 18 slgnified subject-matter for further interpretation; something to be thought
about. Objects are finalitles; the,y are complete,
finished; they oall for thought only in the way
of definltion, classifioation, 10glcal arrangements, eto.'" 7.
-Water as all. object of sCience, as H20 wlth all
the other soientlfio propositions whIch can be
made about it, is not a rival for positlon in
real being with the water we see and use. It Is,
because of experlmental operations, all. added Instrumentaltty of multiplied controls and uses of
the real things of everyday experienoes." 8.
Knowing in. this case becomes a matter of control of operations
for the sake of achieving events.

Knowing is experimental and

is 'a matter· of control of consequences all. the basis of control
over known operations in Which knowing is a partiCipation in
the situation finally produced.
and Within nature.

In short it is instrumental

These two words, instrumental and within

nature are very important in locating the nature of John
Dewey's philosopby'.

Instrumental indicates that knowing is

the means for promoting growth and not flnal values.

And

~

Within nature - explains his effort to confine What is knowable to man and the operations of man in his mental operations,
to a natural, and not a supernatural agenoy.

~or

John Dewey,

life Is the problem of all. organism in relation to all. environment in whioh it must maintain a suocessful adjustment •
• ailure to do so means extinction.

Therefore, what is worth

7. Dewey; The Quest for Certainty, p. 99.
8. !2!!, p. 106.

- knowing for man are those relations whioh will enable him to
survive and to grow in the oapacity of giving greater meaning
and therefore greater success to the process.
~oWlng

is seen to be a partioipant in what is
.finally known. Iloreover. the metapqsios of existenoe as something fixed and therefore oapable
of literally exaot mathematioal description and
prediction is undermined. Knowing ia, for philosophical theory, a case of speoially directed
aotivity instead of something isolated from practioe. !he quest for oertainty by means of exaot
possession in mind'of immutable reality is exohanged for searoh for seourity by means of aotive
oontrol of the ohanging oourse of events. Intellig$noe in operation, another name for method, be-'
oomes the thing most worth winning." 9.
Prom this point of view "aotion" is raised to a matter of equal
dignity and importance with thinking. for only as things are
,

.

,;.

done,does~owledge

arise.

For the proof and realization of

knowing is in the sucoessful outcome of an operation which in
its outoome
reveals new
.
.'

ndata"~
·':fI.·

.

!his furnishes the basis for

new operations and newoontrols, values and meanings.

As has

been pOinted out, this conception of knowledge discounts the
need for absolutes and univ.ersals. represented partially in
things, whioh the mind in its operation mustabstraot, or in
some other manner produce.

.or John Dewey. the philosophy

whioh made that a necessity. was an unfortunate aooident of
history as the Greek thinkers, who gave rational form to a
quest for certainty that was antecedent in the life of the primitive man, did so before science was available as a means
of.knowledge or oontrol.
9. Ib~d, p. 204.

--------------------------------------------.
Disoounting 'he values outside of nature, whioh aooording

II"'"

to Dewey were merelT the produot of the fallacious formulation
of the problem of knowing of cla8sioal philosophy, he is faced
with the task of showing how sensation, perception, thinking,
logic, ideas,

univ~,rsals,

values, and meanings, etc. are pos-

sible in the realm of "experience,"as exemplified by the
methods of science in the realm of nature with no relianee,connection or obligations to the supernatural.

)lor him, knowing

which operates wi thin nature in sCience, has proven itself as
the only kind of knowing possible to man because it has proven
the impossibility of knOWing absolutes in science 'as postulated
by classical ph.ilosophy.

By this act of upsetting the theory

of absolutes' in so ience. '~t' disoounts the theory of absolutes
in general, and therefore, 'th'e only valid kind of knowledge
for man is that Which he has' about operations within nature.
To follow his explanation of this kind of knowing, we will
have to start with his desorip,tion of what "experienoe" is.
":&xperienoe" is an undertaking ,that transforms a problematic
situation into a resolved one.

Only the individual things

Whioh are the fruits of intelligent action have in them intrinsic order ,and fullness of qualities.
"We have an experience when the material experienced
runs its course to fulfillment. Then and only then
is it integrated within and demarcated in the general stream of experience from other experience. A
pieoe of work is finished in a way that is satisfaotory; a problem receives ita solution; a game i.
played through; a situation, whether that of eating
a meal, playing a game of chess, carrying on a

~------------------------------------------------------,
~

oonvGraation. writing a book, or-taking part in a
»olitioal camp.lgn, is so rounded out that its
olose is a oonsummation and not a oessation. SUch
an experience ' is a whole and carried with it its
own individualizing quality and self-sufficiency.
It is an experience.- 10.

John Dewey resolves his problem of "experienoe" within nature, as the basis of knowledge and aotion, by stating that
mind and matter are two aspects of behavior instead of being
identified as two separate categories which must in some manner
breach the gap between themselves.

He feels that the separa-

tion between mind and matter is unnecessary and the reason he
advances for his opinions is best expressed in his own words.
"I think that the habit of regarding the mental
and physioal as separate things has its roots in
regarding them as substances or processes instead
of functions and qualities of aotion." 11.
Having established the fact that mind and matter are but
two aspects of behavior in nature, as stimulus - response of
"experience," it becomes neoessary for him to explain how all
the operations of a rational being are but modes of this phenomenon.
Katter is not an entity.

It is the character of

a na-

tural event in its sequential order 12. and lUND expresses the

.

-

charaoter of a natural event in its meanings and its logioal
conneotions and dependencies.

It is an organized system of

IC·Dewey, Art as Experience, p. 35.
11.Dewey, PhilosoPhl and Civilization, p. 302.
l2.Dewey, Experience and Bature, p. 73.

*mean1ng of whioh OOli"SOIOUSNESI.is the immediate awareness of
*meaning.
nThere is an obvious difference between mind and
oonsoiousness; meaning and idea. Kind denotes
the whole 8.1stem of meanings as they are embodied
in the workings of organic life; consciousness in
a b.lng With language denotes an awareness or peroeption of meanings; it is the peroeption of aotual
events, whether past, contemporar,y or future, in
their meanings, the havlng of aotual id.as ••••lnd
ls oontextual and persistent; oonsoiousness is
focal and transitive. n 13.
SENSATION
John Dewey holds that sensations are not parts of any
knowledge but are merely the stimull for an aot of inquiry
which will bring about an adjustment with the environment.
They are merely stimuli to refleotion and inferenc •• 14.
PERCEPTION
Perc eption furnishes the pro"blem for knowing by refering
the present to its oonsequences.
not an objeot of knowledge.

It is something to be known

It seleots from the mass of pre-

sented qualities those whioh throw light on the nature of the
problem with a view to making them the basis of the problematio
situation. 15., li.
Imagination is the gateway through which meamiBgs derived
from previous experiences enter into a relation with the
*The term meaning as used in this context will be fully' explained later.
13.
14.
15.
16.

Ibld, p. 303.
15e..ey; !he Reconstruction in Philosophy, pp.68,89-90.
Dewey; Jxperienoe and Bature, p. IS2.
Dewey; 'he Quest for dertainty, p. 90.

~--------------------------------------------------------------I
~

present s1tuation.

It 1s also the method by which an enaot-

ment of the meane - oonsequences can be tried out without the
organism getting involved in any overt action. 17., 18.
INTUITION
To explain this phenomenon,

~ewey

establishes a field of

·organic activities and receptivities" Which are natural to the
organism and which are subconscious in their charaoter, but
which unconsciously give us the "immediate qualitative feelof rightness or wrongness about our conscious seleotions of
data and meanings to be used in sucoessfully resolving our
problems.

Between the purely suboonsoious operation of these

organic activities, and our consoious field of operation is a
meeting ground of the two, oalled the "fringe- Whioh is the
field of operation of intuition.
-Apart from language, from imputed and inferred
meaning, we oontinually engage in an immense
multitude of immediate orfanic selections, rejections, weloomlngs, expuls ons, appropriations,
withdrawals, shrinkings, expansions, elations,
and dejeotions, attaoks, wardings off, of the most
minute, vibratingly delioate nature. We are not
aware of the qualities of many of or most of these
aots; we do not objectively distinguish and identify
them. Yet they exist as feelings and qualities and
have enormous direotive effeot on our behavior.
If, for example, oertain sensory qualities of whioh
we are not oognitively aware oease to exist, We
oannot stand or oontrol our posture and movements.
In a thoroughlY normal organism. these -feelings"
have an effioienoy of operation Whioh it is impossible for thought to match. Iven our most
highly intelleotualized operations depend upon
them as a "fringe" by whioh to guide our inferential
~7.

Dewey; Art as Experienoe, p. 272.
18. Dewey; Experience and Nature, p. 29.

,.,"

--------------------~--------------------------------------------,

movements. ~., give us our sense of rightness or wrongn.ss •••• Formulat6d discourse is
mainly but a selected statement of what we wish
to retain among all these inCipient starts, followed by ups and breaking off.--These qualities
are the stuff of "intuitions" and in actuality
the difference between an intuitive and an analytical person is at most a matter of degree of
relative emphasis. The "reasoning" person is one
who makes hi$ "1ntui tions" more articulate, more
deliverable in speech as explicit sequence of
initial premises, jointures. and conclusions." 19.

RlSFIECTIO.N
"

Reflection in John Dewey's theory is not a goiDg back to
an earlier more certain form of knowledge.

It is not an "iden-

tification" with something else that is known immediately or
intuitivelY.

It is rather consulting what is already known to

get our bearings in a new situation, the outcome of which. as
in the ease of the Michelson-Korley experiment, may be something
which causes men to revise what they thought they previously
knew.

This was the case in the experimental discovery that

the velocity of light remains the same when measured either
with or against the direction of the earth's surfaoe.

It is

essential for the construction of a hypothesis which will result in s successful resolution of a problematic situation. 20.

MEMORY
Memory is our awareness of the values and meanings contS,ined in our past experiences. 21.
19. Ibid. pp. 299-300.
20. Dewey; The Quest for Certaint,' pp. 170-194.
21. Dewey; Art as Experience, p. 1.

- mT~LLIGENCE!

-

JUIUDNTS, aDd REASON

Inte11igenoe is the capaoity to estimate ,the possibilities

of a situation aDd to act in acoordance with this, estimate.
It involves the seleotion and arrangement of means to effect
consequences and with a choice of what we take as our ends.
Whenever intelligence operates, things are judged in their
capacity of signs of other things.

It oonsists in grasping

relationships. 22.
Beason is experimental intelligence, conceived after the .
pattern of science.

23.

MEANIlG-IDEAS-THOUGHT
It is also advisable to treat these three items together because of the olose interrelation of their operations.

In faot

they are merely ways of designating how natute operates; the
operation being one interrelated Whole of whioh the various
names we give to oertain phases of the operation merely brings
into relief certain elements that we wish to observe more
closely, like the "close-ups" in a moving picture.

According

to Dewe.r we cannot mark off certain operations in nature to
give them existential oharacter of distinct individuality without falling into the error of forming the rigid categories of
classical philosophy whioh distinguished certain operations as
belonging to matter and change, and certain others as belonging to mind and permanency.
22. Dewey; ~he Quest for UertaintI, p. 213.
23. Dewey; Reoonstruction in PhiloaoPhl,p. 5.

.eaning is a method of action as a means to a

~hared

consummation that two people and an object can have in oommon.
It is something that becomes a property of behavior, and secondarily a property of objects.

It constitutes the intelligi-

bility of acts and things.
"!hus every meaning is generic or universal. It
is something oommon between speaker, hearer, and
the thing to which speech refers. It is universal also as a means of generalization. Por a
meaning is a method of action, a way of using things
as means to a shared consummation, and method is
general, though the things to which it is applied
are particular. The meaning, for example of
portability is something in Which two persons and
an objeot share. But portability after it is once
apprehended beoomes a way of treating other things;
it is extended widely. Whenever this is a ohanee
it is applied; applioation ceases only when a
thing refuses to be treated in this way •••
It would be difficult to imagine any doctrine more absurd than the theory that general
ideas or meanings arise by the comparison of a
number of particulars, eventuating in t~e recognition of something common to them all.; Such a
-comparison may be employed to check a suggested
widened applioation of a rule. But generalization
is oarried spontaneously' as far as it W1ll aotually go."; A newly aoquired meaning is foroed
upon everything that does not obviously' resist its
application, as a child uses a new word Whenever
he gets a chance or as he p~ays with a new toy.
Meanings are self-moving to new oa8es. In the
end, oonditions foroe a chastening of this spontaneous tendency. the soope and limits of applioation are asoertained experimentally in the
process of applicatioB." 24.
Meanings are possible because of "tools" which enable an aotion
to be oarried out.

In this sense language and communication

beoome most important "tools."
24.

~,

p. 188.

Man is enabled to use the

-tool- of languag., to enaot aotion without resorting to overt
aotion.

In this manner he is able to widen the soope of the

possibilities of his aotivity.

language as symbols further

widens man's sphere of aotion when these symbols beoome more
exaoting in looating the more important aspects of the many
possible meanings attaohed to a given word.

!his prooess of

refining and purifying words to a more oonfining aspeot of
meaning is a prooess of abstraction which reaches its highest
form of usefulness When the abstraotion reaohes a stage Where
it is an identifying form of its own and can set up relationship with other things because of its liberated state.
is the oase when water is designated as H20.

!his

!he term H20

permits a wider range of relationship with other things than
that enjoyed by its term water.

!his is basically the ex-

planation that Dewey gives for mathematical terms whioh were
originally identifying terms for such overt action as oounting,
keeping tally, noting transaotions, eto.

When the process in-

volved reaohed the stage of abstraotion and number was the
means of conneoting previously unrelated events and objeots,
mathematios beoame an operation oapable of being oarried on
apart from immediate overt aotion with a series of new relationships with other events which enormously increased the
power of man to deal with nature.
ftfo pass over in science the human meanings of the
oonsequences of natural interactions is legitimate;
indeed it is indispensable. fo asoertain and state
meanings in abstraction from ~ocial or shared situations is the only way in whioh the latter oan be

1ntelligently modified, extended and varied. Mathematical s,ymbols have least connection with distinctively human situations and consequences; and
the finding of such terms, free from esthetic and
moral significance, is a necessary part of the
technique. Indeed, such elimination of ulterior
meanings supplies perhaps the best possible empirical definition of mathematical relations. They
are meanings without direct reference to human
behavior. Thus an essence becomes Wholly "intellectual" or scientific, devoid of consummatory implication; it expresses the purely instrumental
with reference to the objects to which the events
in question are instrumental. It then becomes the
starting point of reflection that may terminate in
ends or consequences in huaan suffering and enjoyment not previously experienced. Abstraction from
any particular consequence (which is the same thing
as taking instrumentality generally), opens the
way to new uses and consequences." 25.
UNIVERSAL

Is a relation of means consequence which

defi~es

an operation

.part from the instance in which it receives overt o'bjectification, although its meaning is found only in that actualization. 26.
BSSImCBS

"Essence is never existence.
existence.

It is the distilled import of

In it, feeling and understanding are one." 27.

It is the meaning which has extensive and recurrent consequences.

When potential consequences are important and re-

peated they form its defining and identifying form. 28.
25. Ibid, pp. 191-192.
26. Dewey; The Quest for Oertainty, p. 163.
27. 28. Dewey; Experience and Nature, p. 182 •
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Consoiousness may be oonsidered the operation and "ideas"

the result of that operation.

They are the result of the grasp

of meaning in its state of re-direotion, re-adaptatlon or reorganization in the prooess of thinking.

An Idea is the !!a-

nlfying of a meaning by bringing to a sharp focal form a meaning as a part of the whole oontext of meaning - whioh is Mind.
It is the prooess of attending to a partioular meaning.
THOUGHT
Thought is a mode of direct overt aotion in whioh the problematio situation has been oarried over into a resolved one.
It is no; a speoifio power but oonsists of the procedures
tentionalll employed to resolve a problem.

~

It is by this very

nature, experimental.
"Thought and reason are not speoifio rowers. They
consist of the prooedures intentional~y employed in
the application to eaoh other of the unsatisfaotorily
oonfused and indeterminate on one side and the regular and stable on the other. Generalizing from
such observation, empirical philosophY perceives
that thinking is a oontinuous prooess of temporal
re-organization within one and the same world of
experienced things, not a jump from the latter
world into one of obJeots, constituted once for all
by thought." 29.
~ut the constructive office of thought is empirioal-that is. experimental. "Thought" is not a property
of something termed intelleot or reason apart from
nature. It is a mode of direoted overt aotion.
Ideas are antioipatory plans and designs whioh take
effect in oonorete reoonstruotions of the anteoedent
oonditions of existence." 30.

29. !!!!!,pp. 67 -68.
30. Dewey; The Quest for Certainty. p. 167.

Mathematics __ an operation of reasoning has long been
pointed to as proof of the existence of a speoia1 property
oa11ed mind beoause it was able to carry on its operations with
out any seeming relation to material things for its development.

This seemed to be self-evident proof of the fact that

man as a reasoning animal had the capaoity of an operation that
was not material in its charaoter and therefore spiritual in
its nature.

This diVision into oategories of Mind and Matter

is what Dewey calls the "illusion" of classical philosophy
and he takes the occasion in his discussion of logic to show
that mathematical logic is an operation entirely within nature.
having its dependencies on overt action, or to state it
another way, through -experience," as he has defined "experience •. "

It will be well at this point to let John Dewey

speak for himself.
-The distinction between p)lysica1 and mathematical
conception may be brought out by noting an ambiguity in the term -possible." Any idea as suoh designates an operation that may be performed. not
something in aotua1 existenoe. The idea of the
aweetness of, say. sugar, is an indiOitfon'of the
consequenees of a possible operation of tasting.
as distinct from a directly experienced quality.
Xathematica1 ideas are designations of
pOSsible operations in another and secondary sense
previously expressed in speaking of the possibi1tty
of symbolic operatiOns with respect to one another.
This sense of possibility is compossibility (able
to exist together) of operations, not possibility
of performance with respect to existence ••• lts
"DOn-tncompatibi1ity" (unopposed in character)
indicates that all developments are welcome as
long as they do not c·onf1iot with one another, or
as long as restatement of an operation prevents
aotua1 oonf1iot. It may be cqmposed with natural

seleotion, which is a principle of elimination but
not one of controlling positive development." 31.
EMOTION

Emotion is the resulting condition of responsive behavior
in its immediate quality, when we are confronted with the precarious as a problem to be resolved.

It marks off the even

tenor of existence when it is uncertain of the present situation in regard to its issue. 32.
KNoWLEDGE

It is inevitably clear from the presentation of the previous
material, what the nature of "knowledge" is in John Dewey's
philosophy.

It is the outoome of "experienoe," which is the

experimental method applied to problems which arise from the
necessary adjustment that an organism, endowed with reason,
has to make with its environment.

SCience made its progress

by being able to establish control of results by its knowledge,
not of things as such, but of established relationships in the
elements of change in phenomena.

the advanoe in soienoe which

discredited :Newtonls physios beoause it postulated "substanoes" as time, matter, and space and motion, along with the
theory of indeterminancy of Heisenberg, makes it clear to
John Dewey that the theory of absolutes has to be abandoned;

and the only thing that man can know are the fixed relations
of ohange, and that this knowledge is one of growth gained
31. laid, pp. 159-160.

32. J.lewey. Bxperienc e and Nature, p. 390.

with the result that all values in the moral, social and religious field are suaject to guidanoe, growth, and development
through the use of the experimental method in oonjunction with
the higher aspirations, ideals and hopes of man.

Purther,all

the operations of mind and the higher aspirations, ideals, and
hopes of man are within nature.

They are phases of nature

similar to that of physical phenomena, but on a higher plane.
~opes and fears, desires and aversions, are as
truly responses to things as are knowing and thinking. Our affeotions, when they are enlightened by
understanding, are organs by whioh we enter into
the meaning of the natural world as genuinely as
by knowing, and with greater fullness and intimaoy. !his deeper and rioher interoourse with
things can be effeoted only by thought and its
resultant knowledge; the arts in w~ich the potential meanings of nature are realized demand an
intermediate and transitional phase of detachment
and abstraotion. The colder and less int,. .t8u
transaotions of knowing involve temporary disregard
of the qualities and values to which our affeotions
and enjoyments are attached. But knowledge is an
indispensable medium of our hopes and fears, of
loves and hates, 1f desires and preferences are to
be steady, ordered, charged with meaning, secure.- 35.

-Affections. desires. purposes, choioes are going
to endure as long as man is man; therefore as long
as man 1s man, there are going to be ideas, judgments, beliefs about values. Bothing could be
sillier than to attempt to justify their existence at large; they are going to exist anyway.
What is inev1tab1e needs no proof for its existence.
BUt these expressions of our nature need direotion,
and direotion is possible only through knowledge. 1 36.

36. ~, p. 297~
36. Ibid, p. 299.

"

Being intellectually honest John Dewey must accept the inevitable conclusions of his philosophY of ttexperience," Whioh
finds all human acts and destiny within nature.

!his makes it

necessary for him to deny the supernatural character of religion and therefore to 'deny the idea of God.

Religion for him

becomes that character of "experience" which is the contemplation of the consummation of our process of knowing with our
higher aspirations and ideals.
"Understanding and knowledge also enter into a
perspective that is religious in quality. Faith
in the continued disclosing of truth through directed cooperative human endeavor is more religious in quality than is any faith in a completed revelation ••• But faith in the possibilities
of continued and rigorous •••• !here is such a
thing as faith in intelligence becoming religious
in quality." 37.
!he chief purpose in making this short, but I hope oomp1ete,
survey of John Dewey's philosophy is to furnish the baokground
for evaluating his philosophy of Art.
olosed, I am sure, that

~xperience"

!his survey has disis the occasion for all

human values, and in which therefore his explanation of Art
must be looked for.

37. Dewey; !he Common Faith. p. 26;
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Jaoques Marltain ls a follower of the

philosop~

of St. !homas

Aqulnas and so the task of this chapter will be to present the
broad out11nes of St. thomas Aquinas'

philosop~.

Slnce hls

phl1osophy, unllke that of John Dewey's. follows a ·olassloal"
pattern lt might be sufficient to present lt in chart form with
some remarks ln summatlon rather than to present it ln essay
form.

•
GOD

!here is proof of the existence of God.
CS. !., I., q. 2, a. 2)
HI ls the

CAUSB
(8. ! •• I. Q. 1. a. 2)

FIRST CAUSE AND FINAL

GOD'S wlll the cause of thlngs
CS. ! •• I., q. 19, a. 4)
:four Causes
1. :flnal Cause
2. ~ormal Caus.
3. Bfflclent Cause
4. Material Cause

BE Crea1led

I •• q. 90~ a. 2)
Pr1me Mat'er (Po'ent1a11ty) 301ned to certa1n forms
result1ng 1n a h1erarcn, 1n nature
(S. t •• I •• q. 18. a. 1, ad 2um)
(8. f ••

1.

2.
3.
4.

5.

(ACT) _

1norgan10 - lack of movement
l1v1ng organ1sms - vegetat1ve - movement
an1mala - motor and sens1t1ve - self-movement
man - motor. sens1t1ve, and 1ntellectual
angels - spir1tual (acts 1ndependant of matter)

•
composed of

BODY

and

mater1al

SOUL

sp1r1tual-the f1rst pr1nciple
of 11fe
CS. f., I •• q. 75, a. 1)

(S. f •• I., q. 75, a. 3)

w1th oerta1n
POWERS OF THE SOUL
(a: !., I., 2. 77. a. 1=4)

I.

(~ !.~

II.
(S. T. ,

IBTELLBCfUAL
It q. 79,a. 1-18)
APPETITIVE

I.,

q.

SEBSITIVE
(S. f •• I. t t.. 811 a. 1-3)'
Irasoible
ooncup1so1ble
(S.! •• I-II, q. 23, a. 1-4)

80. a. 1-2)

II TELLECTUAL
I •• q. 82. a. 1-5)

(8. ! ••

WILL

Pass10ns of
FREE-WILL

(a.T., I., q.
1.

Love and Hatred

1. Hope and Despa1r

2.

Des1re and Avers10n

2. li'ear and Dar1ng

3.

Pleasure and aadnesa 3. Anger
(S. !., I-II. q. 25, a. 4)

•

as,

a. 1-4)

HOW !HI IBTELI.J5CTUAL POORS OPERATI

ln the

(s.

1.

PRAOT leAL ORDIR
T. e I., q. 79, a. 11)

(for the sake of something e1s8)
..A.CTlOlL (Mora11ty )

liAISING (Arta)
What reason estab11shes 1n
erterna1 th1nss
(S. !., I., q. 79, a. 111

WhAt reason eatab11shes

ln the aot of our Wl11
ln the use of our .reedom
(S. !., I., q. 79, a.11)
the ultimate end ls the flrst princlp1e
ln practical matters

(S. T., I., q. 1, a. 2)
2.

SPECUIA.TIVB OBDER

(for Its own aake)

(8. T., I., q. 79, a. 1)

Kinds of Knowlng
(S.!., I., q. 79, a. 1)
1. .alth: assent to Truth as revealed by God (a. f •• II-ll,q.8)
2. Uijderstandlns: a glft of supernatural 11ght and ls the
lmmedlate grasp of f~th
(8. T., I., q. 79, a. 9. ad 4um)
3. SolellOe:, Whloh produoes knowledge demonstratlvely by
attrlbuting oauses (a. T., I •• q. 79, a. 9)
Process of Knowlng
(8, !., I., q. ~, a. 1-8)
Jl1nA
.. ,_..,,_•.

''''''''''''

_----..,

Sensations - pure sense
stimulation
__ i-' Perceptlon - recognl tlon

.__---.r--Image Idea---!he un1versa1 18 an aastrlotlon from ~he phantaaa (1mage) by the
acting lntel1ect as the la.own ls ln t l1e knower aocordlng to the
mode of the knower. there'iore, the ma~erlal object must be known
!mmaterlalll 1n the mlnd.
--_.
1

)(emo17

Judgment: whlch deterll1ne~ that the f ~rm apprehended 1s good.
Beason1ng 1s a prooess of 'passilJg frol~ the known to the unDon.
We know a thing 1n a more or le8s vague way at the
beg1nning (general concept) and more distinctlY as
we become more aoquainted with lt .e make it more universal

BOW
!11Ii APPA!IlfIV&
l?C8BS OF JI.U OPERA'fB
..
... ...."
*.t _••

SlII81~iu !OUBS
la_lOA ..OOllpaDl..

_04111' ohaD&_

_k•• " _ .., of 'he Seul'1"?

"

-<

-------.~

(8.t..l.4..12.&.2)

RA~UH~

.

Iba' 1t 40••
Ie alao 81TeA a tOfta - LOB.
!hi. foa 1a a pJ'lDOlple 01
. . \loa 1fhloh prot. . . .cae
__loa ... th. pa".' ot the
\oWa~8 the' oal_'..
.

~
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1'OW8"
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::18.
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*1. 0lY'1C!

the patle.'

A.·
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~Q~
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'>- *8. O.IJlCf
,
D:B8lB
----.....;>~ lUll!
(a.~•• 1.,.83....1)
l.!!l:.' 1. in the , . .••aloa ot
(a.'••l-n.:q••t ..a.~)
.
\he ell ,eo' (When 1004)
Ia
a
1_11\7
whloh
18
a.
41a•
H
:tH1\11a
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Set 1. . .

li~.'Wll
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Iaapll. . ··a··pert.. \loaof a power.
A "1'al halll' la a .\1t \hat OIl•
. . . . .ell..

(WIle . .11)

h"ud. . .
JUst10.

Iholo le.l. Yl.tue.

., TB;.! •• f-II.l:.,U •••l-4)

:falth
Bop•
Ch...lty'

l

Anything i. knowable in so far as it i. aotua1 (ulade up of
matter and form); that Whioh is potential in 80 far as 1t i.
otentia1, but not prime-matter since it is purely potential
S. ! •• I., q. 14, a. 3. ad 3um)
.

l

Inte1leot is potentiality and is made aotual through knowing
Intelligence is a possession of the truth not
a prooess
~niOl1 is belief
wieds. is oertainty
Issence is the definition of a thing
-.
(De Bnte et Bssentia, c. 1)
~hi10s0Phl

~etaphysios

to understand What is immediate in experience
in the light of first principles.
philosophY whioh goes beyond all material
oonditions.

fheo10gy haa GOD for its subjeot matter. deals with revealed truth.
(S. f., I •• q. 1, a. 1. ad 5ua)
Bvery agent of neoessity ~ots, for an e~. things whioh have no
knowledge tend towards their ends as the result of their nature
Which is as disposed. !he end of everything is its own perfeotion. Bnds are principle. of human action.
!here are two kiDds of Action,
~~ansient Action prooeeds from agent to something outside himself.
Immanent Action is for the good of the agent.
(S. f., I, q. 5, a. 2. ad 3ua)
1.

(S.

GOOD

f •• I. q. 6. a. 6)

Is that whioh everything desires and everything is good
in so far as it is perfeot.
2. !he Good is present in the Will a8 Knowledge
3. truth is the same as knowledge
4. truth i8 the only thing Whioh satisfies the intelleot.
S. !he ultimate happiness of man is found in his inte11eot,
and 1eaels to
WIaDOll (i_anent aotionj
(8. , •• ~., q. i, a. 6
whioh 1s knowledge of the .irst Cause
and is the life most proper to man since it is basioally intel1eotual. the ultimate happiness of man is found in his inte11eot which is
BEATITUDE
U17"'! •• I, q. 3, a. 8)
Which is the oontemp1ation of wisdom for its own sake and is the
ultimate happiness for man as a oreature possessing rea.on.

CHAPTER 3

!HE PHILOSOPHY OF ART OF JOHN

DE~m

*
Since John Dewey states that the life of man is within nature
(

in the form of "experience," it will be in "experience", as
he has defined that term that his explanation of Art must be
looked for.

As stated in Ohapter I, -experience" is not just

a matter of undergoing and reaotions, but oonsists in
ing a problematic situation into a sucoessful outoome.

resolv~

In this

prooess man is first aware that a problem exists; seoond, he
forms a hypothesis for the solution of the problem, and third,
he proceeds to act on the basis of the hypothesis and then
evaluate its outcome.

In this prooess of "experience," what

is oalled Art is a oertain oondition attending the "experience"
and therefore, there is no fundamental differenoe between art
and "experience."

Art is a quality that permeates experience.l.

It is in the rhythmiO movement from change to stability in experienoe whioh looates the esthetio.

Life is a stream of ohange

but the esthetio is not a passing, fleeting thing, as/"there
abides the deep-seated memory of an underlying harmony, the
sense of which haunts life like the sense of being founded on a
rook. "
"Life grows when a temporary falling out is a transition to a more extensive balance of the energies
of the organism with those of conditions under whioh
1. Dewey, Art as Experienoe, p. 46.

it llv.s ••••• the world is full of things that are
indifferent and even hostile to lifei the ver,r
prooesses by whioh life is maintained tend to throw
it out of gear with its surroundings. Ievertheless t
if life oontinues, and in continuing it expands,
there is an overooming of factors of opposition and
oonflioti there is a transformation of them into
differentiated aspects of a higher powered and more
signifioant life ••• Here in germ are balanoe and
harmony attained through rhythm. 2.
The esthetic is the happiness and delight whioh comes at the
moment of equilibrium, When the problematic situation has arrived at successful and intentional adjustment of the organism
with its environment.

It is an espeoially illuminating moment

Where the past meanings, present meaning and future meanings
conneoted with the event add to the quiokening of the "here
and now." 3.
Art is a resting in the oonscious resolution of the problematio.

!he scientist who is also interested in this same sit-

uation, is however, interested not in the same way.

The sci-

entist is interested in the resolution, but does not rest in
it as the artist does. 4.
there is also no difference between Fine Art and Useful
Art.

It is a distinction whioh is extrinsic to the esthetic.

Some things whioh were once the objects of use, may now be
museum pieces, such as the Greek vases, which were originally
2. OR! cit •• p. 14.
3.
°E· cit. t p. 18.
4. 0:2. oi t., p. 15.

objects of every day use.

Things are esthetic in the degree

to which "the whole oreature is alive and in which he possesses
his living through enjoyment of an 'experience' whioh will contribute direotly and liberally to an expanding and rich life."5.
When a thing is merely useful it fails to employ the whole
creature and fails to be an "experience."

~

"experience." as

John Dewey uses the term, is one in which the whole creature
operates to produce an expanding and enriched life; and for a
thing to be merely useful means that it has not used the full
resources of man.
"It is this degree of completeness of living in the
experience of making and of perceiving that makes the
difference between what is fine or esthetic in art
and what is not. Whether the thing made is put to
use, as are bowls, rugs, garments, weapons, is intrinsically speaking, a matter of indifference.7W 6.
Art is

intellec~ual

to the end.

in the degree to which it orders the means

In the preceding

p~ges

the words, artistio, and

esthetio have been used in connection with the description of
"experience."

Ourlanguage does not provide a word which would

combine the two, although that would be very useful in this
situation.

Artistic refers to the production and the esthetic

to that of perceptions and enjoyment. 7.

It expresses the

consumer's point of view rather than the producer's.
Art is also a process of selection of the means for the
desired end.

In that sense art can never be "imitation" of the

5. Ope C it., p. 27.
6. Op_ Cit., pp. 26-27.
7. OP. cit., p. 46.

visual appearance. of things, but is a oreation Whioh must
select signifioant phases of things and order them to suit
the purpose of a work of art.

!he process of selection is an

interesting problem, for it requires the right seleotion of
the means for the end in view, and is acoomplished by means of
a prooess whioh is difficult to define, and whioh might be
oalled "a hunch."

!his "hunch" is also faoilitated by the in-

tensity of the emotion oalled out by the problematio situation.
Bsthetio experiences are emotional, but only in the sense that
emotion is something which oolors "experience" and is not
something apart from it." 8., 9.
fhe term "emotion" must be further speoified because the usual
notion of emotion is that of something oomplete Within itself
and the outoome of an aotion, Whereas acoording to Dewey it is
an implioation in a situation whioh is in suspense.

When the

implioations in the suspense are great, they draw out meanings
from the. depths of our· experiences whioh gives to the resulting act greater value and greater unity. 10.
Selection ia art is from the meanings in past experiences;
and When these are integrated with the new situation it oreates the spontaneous element of the new produotion.
"!he spontaneous in art is oomplete absorption in
the subject matter that is fresh, the freshness of
Whioh holds and sustains emotion. 1I What is expressed
will be neither the past events that have exercised
',,9. Ope oit., p. 42.
Ope cit., p. 67.

10.

their shaping influence nor yet the literal existing oooasion. It will be, in,~the degree of
ita spontaneity, an intimate union of the features of present existence with values that past
experience have incorporated in personality. Immediaoy and individuality, the traits that mark
ooncrete existence, oome from the present oooasian; meaning, substanoe, oontent, from what is
embedded in the self from the past.~ 11.
~he

qualit,y of spontaneity in the meeting of the old and the

new is what John Dewey oalls

"Intuition.~

12.

In this oonneotion it is also interesting to note that in his
book: THE QUEST l!'OR CERTAINTY, p. 160, he refers to the ability
to have an

·intuition,~

as a kind of wit whioh is even more

produotive than thought.
Are is not a
other inquiries.

~truth"

whioh has for its purpose use in

"It is rather a signification of the integra-

tion of parts." 13.

This integration of parts is what John

Dewey oalls the "form" of an experience.
Art is creative in the sense that the material of the natural world whioh is taken by the self, is assimilated and
returned to the world in the form of a new and individualized
expression.

This expression can also beoome a part of those

who perceive it, when they bring to it their own funded meanings of

"experienoe,~

and recreate the work for themselves.

In this sense, art is spoken of as being "universal," and is
aohieved by means of the "form" of the work of art.
J.J.. Ope cit., pp. 70-71..
12. OPe oIt., p. 266.
15. Ope oit., p. 55.

-

"Form" 1s esthet10 when it is freed from the looal and

limited meanings of an object and becomes the more deliberate
unity of the organization or "design" of those elements which
carry any event, object, soene or situation to its own integral fulfillment.
~orm is a character of every experience that is an
experience. Art in its speoific sense enacts more
deliberately and fully the conditions that effeot
unity. Form may then be defined as the operation
of forces that carry the experience of an event,
object, scene, and situation to its own integral
fulfillment." 14.

Art is, thus, that which produces a higher degree of unity in
"Experience" and therefore gives it greater meaning.
position John

~ewey

By this

maintains the consistency of explaining

all phenomena of life as occurring within nature.

Art is but

another way of experiencing the common world and its fullness
in a fuller and more intense way and technique becomes the 1ndividual discovery of the proper relationship of means and
ends.
While every work of art has its immediate quality, due to
its unity; yet after this first experience of it, we are conscious of its larger unity with a wider sphere of reality.
thus while being a unit, with a distinct experience of its
own, it also has the capacity for greater meaning in the
totality of all possible meanings.
-We are, as it were, introduced into worlds beyond
this world which is nevertheless the deeper rea11ty of
14.

OPe

cit., p. 137.

the world in which we live in our ordinary experiences." 16.
The esthetic experience is conveyed by the medium of "form",
a word which implies an integration, through relations, of
color, light, line, and space.

!his is the language of art and

is common to the various plastic Arts.

A knowledge of these

principles of art does not result in the understanding of a
work of art, but on the other hand a work of art is more likely
to be known if we have an intelleotual appreCiation of these
principles.

It helps to prepare the ground for understanding.

As has been previously stated, art is not "imitation."
That is, it does not attempt to literally reproduce the appearance of things but discovers in them, elements that are suited
to its purposes.

The selection of the appropriate elements in

things is a process of "abstraction," which appears at times to
amount to a transformation.
This effect is the result of its removal from its former
context, or because certain effects are desired it may be
"stepped up," like a "close-up" in a "mOVie."

It is this fac-

tor of abstraction which makes it so difficult for persons who
are aocustomed to natural appearanoes in things, to accept them
in their new environment.

Art, especially modern art, some-

times, looks unreal and strange to them, not to say queer.
Some further characteristics of the esthetic form are
continuity, cumulation, conservation, tension, and antiOipation.
16. op. cit., p. 196.

~he,y

provoke a rhythm. of resolution and problem - and problem

and resolution, etc.
itself.

This rhythm is also a oharaoter of nature

"The terms 'natural law' and 'natural rhythms' are

synonymous." 16.
In this explanation of the oharaoter of an esthetio experience .here has been no mention of beauty.

This is because

Dewey considers it "properly an emotional term," 17, Whioh he
suggests not USing, because the same idea is better expressed in
the full explanation of

~Art

as Experienoe."

In addition to -rhythm" as an element of the esthetic,
"balance" is a further defining oondition.

~hese

phases of the same organization of energies.

two ideas are

Rhythm is "con-

oerned with movement, with oomings and goings, rather than arrivals." 18.

8rmmetry (balance) is ooncerned with intervals

that define rest and relative fUlfillment. a 19.
Besides the facotrs already mentioned as parts of the common substanoe of art there is space-time and volume. 20.

The

arts are all one in the sense that the.y have a oommon substance.
They are distinguished in the sense that some medium is more
appropriate in a given experience than some other.

!his factor

permits us to speak of some experienoes as dramatic, poetio,
arohiteotural, eto.
oi t.,
o~. oit. ,
lB. O~I oit.,
19. O~I . oi t. ,
20. O~I oi t.,
~6.

17.

O~I

p.
p.
p.
p.
p.

149.
129.
179.
179 •
213.

"In art as an experienoe, aotua11ty and poss1bility
or 1deality, the neW and the old, objective, material and personal response, the individual and the
universal, surfaoe and depth, sense and mean1ng,
are integrated in an experience in whioh they are
all transfigured from the significance that belongs
to them wben isolated in reflection•• of art as experience it is true also that nature has neither
subjeotive nor objeotive being; is neither individual or universal, senuous nor rational. !he
sign1f1cance of art ~ experience is, therefore,
incomparable for the adventure of philosophic
thought." 21.
In regard to what 1s legitimate subject-matter for art,
Dewey seems to think that anything Whioh is a matter of interest
to the artist qua11f1es as being leg1timate.
oonditioned only by sincerity.
Prudence is ins1ncere.

!he artist is

What would give offense to

In oonclusion 1t may be well to restate

the fundamental conditions of art, namely, that 1t is a quality
permeatlng experience.
"Art ls a quality that permeates an experience; it
ls not, save by a flgure of speech, the experience
ltself. Esthetic experience is always more than
esthetlc." 22.
Summary

1.

Llfe for man is wlthin nature as experlence.

2.

Art ls a quallty that permeates experience.

3.

SClenee and Art are parts of the same problematiC sltuatlon;
a) SClence is lnterested ln the resolutlon of the
problem.
b) Art rests in the resolutlon.

4.

!here ls no distinction between the

5.

!he esthetic is the happiness and delight which comes at the

2J..
22.

Ope
Ope

cit., p. 297.
oit., p. 326.

~lne

and Useful Arts.

moment of equilibrium in the sucoessful termination of a
problem.
6. Art is intellectual as it orders means to ends that are
planned for.

It is not "truth."

7. "Intuition" is the way in which it selects the "means."
8. Integration of past meanings with the current problem lives
art a spontaneous quality.
9. Art 1s not "1m1tat1on";the process of selection is one of
"abstraction."

10. "Techn1que" is the discovery of the proper means.
11. Art involves Balance, Rhythm, Space-Time and Solidity.
12. "Form" is the name given to the unified Whole and is
governed by principles common to all the arts.

11. Art 1s complete within 1tself, while at the same time a
relationship to the universal is present.

CHAPTER 4
THE PHILOSOPHY OF ART OF JACQUES MARITAIN
...

'

..

w'f.

M.IM

•

The method of explaining the Philosophy of Art of Jacques Marltain will be, first, to locate it in the framework of the

p~il

osophy of St. Thomas; and then to describe its character and
operation.

For this purpose it will be well to restate that

part of the framework of Chapter 2, which gives the location of
art and which, in a measure, also describes its basic character.
HOW THE INTELLECTUAL

PO¥~RS

OPERATE

1. PRADTICAL ORDER

for the'sake of something else
ACTION (Moraf.-i tZ)
What reason establishes in

What reason establishes in

external things

the act of our Will in the
use of our Freedom.

The ultimate end is the first principle
in practical matters.

*
2. SPECULAT IVE ORDER

for Its own sake

K~nds

of Knowing

1 •• aith: assent to truth as revealed by GOD.
2. Understanding: A gift of the supernatural light in the
immediate grasp of truth.
3. Science: produces knowledge demonstratively by attributing
oauses.

In th1s

~ramework, ~rt

is looated in the practioal Order as

lIaking.
"Art belongs to the Praotical Order. Its orientation is towards d01ng, not to the pure inwardness
of knowledge." 1.
"!he sphere of Making is the sphere of Art, in the
most universal meaning of the word." 2.
Art is divided into two kinds, .ine Arts and Useful Arts.
!he Useful Arts are those which are done for the sake of something else.

!he mak1ng of a oompass, for example, is not for

1 ts own sake ,. but fims its justifioa tion in help1ng to keep a
ship on its course, while .ine Art is something made for its
own sake alone.

!he Ancients did not make this distinction

between the useful and the fine; they classed art as Servile
and llberal.

The Servile Arts were for them those whioh require

corporal labor and the Liberal those whioh did not.

Sculpture

and painting, under this classification, were oonsidered Servile, While musio, logio and arithmetic among others were listed
,
as Liberal. During the medieval period the artist was simplJ
looked upon as Artisan who worked for the common faith.

!he

Renaissance on the other hand started the movement of isolating
the artist from the common social life of sooiety and set him
in search of beauty as an aotivity in itself.
o

Maritain, however, has made it clear that the distinction

between the .ine Arts and the Useful Arts is not what Logioians
oall an "essential" diVision, but derives its character from the

I.
2.

Jacques Karitain; Art and
OPe cit., p. 7.

SOhola~ticism,

p. 4.

end pur.ue4.

!rt can pursue both ends at the same time.

!he differenoe between the .ine Arts and Useful Arts is
that the .ine Arts possess beauty.
ART AN]) BEAUTY
Beauty was defined by St. Thomas as that whioh gives pleasure
on sight, i. e., joy

~

knowledge of the objeot known, not of

knowledge.
"It is of the nature of the beautiful that the
is allayed by the sight or knowledge
of it.· 3.
~ppetite

Beauty delights the mind because it possesses three faotors:
1.

Integrity, because the mind likes being.

2. Proportion, because the mind likes order and unity.
3.

Olarity, because the mind likes intelligibility.
"Beauty' .is the splendor of forms shining on the
proportioned parts of matter.· 4.
!he beautiful is not a kind of truth beoause it is con-

nected with the Lntelligibility of things; rather, it is a
kind of good which results from a vision of the truth which i8
a delight that produoes love.
·-----Oontemplating the objeot in the intuition which
sense has of it. the mind enjoys a presence, enjoys the radiant presence of an intelligibility which
does not reveal itself to its eyes as it is.· 5.
Beauty as has been stated before is a kind of good and not a
kind of truth even though its operation concerns the intelligible.

3.
4.
5.

s.
Ope
Ope

It is a good because "the funotion of beauty is to

!., I-II, q. 27, a. i, ad 3Um •.
oit., p. 26.
cit., p. 169.

gratif1 des1re 1n the mind, the faoulty of enjoyment 1n the
faoulty of know1ng."

6.

"!he ieaut1ful and the good are the same as regards the subject: they have the same foundation, namely, form and the good 1s therefore
commended as beautiful. But they differ in concept •
• or the good, strictly speaking. regards the appetite, that being good which all things desire;
and therefore it partakes of the nature of an end,
for the appetite is as it were a sort of movement
to the thing. !he beautiful, however, concerns
the force of knowledge, for things are said to be
beautiful when they g1ve pleasure at sight---!he
beautiful is the same thing as the good, differing
only conceptually." 7.
This knowledge in the object known is a matter of intuit1on.
It is a matter of the senses and the intellect.

In the matter

of the senses it relates only to sight and hearing. B.

The

senses are a necessary part of the experience because man's
intuition is only made possible by knowledge derived from the
sensea.

It is important to understand this matter of art as an

intuitive experience which utilizes the senses and the intellect in a manner which is not of the process of reasoning or
thought, except secondarily.

Maritain has phrased this pro-

blem with extreme clarity 1n the following quotation:
---"!o understand this, we must conceive that it i8
the mind and the sense combined, or, to use suoh
an express1on, the intellectualized sense, which
gives rise to aesthetic joy in the heart. It is
thereby clear that the mind has no thought--unleas
secondarily and reflectively--of abstraoting from
sensible particulars, in the contemplation of which
it is fixed, the intelliglble reason for 1ts joy;
6. Ope Cit., p.

7.
B.

OPe
Ope

~67.

cit., p. 16B.
clt., p. 23.

it is also olear how the beautiful oan be suoh a
marvellous tonic for the mind, without developing
in the least its power of abstraction or reasoning,
and that the perception of the beautiful is accompanied b.Y that curious feeling of intellectual
fullness through which we seem to be swollen with
a superior knowledge of the object oontemplated
though it leaves us powerless to express and possess
it by our ideas or make it the objeot of scientific
analysis."--- 9.
While this last sentence would make it seem that reason can play
no part in our comprehension, yet an explanation of the principles in art can help to create a disposition for the enjoyment,
although the final act of enjoyment must be a matter of "intuition."
Beauty is transcendental and tends to carry the soul beyond oreation in the realm of the spirit.

Only some of the

works of art make beauty their end and are called 'ine Arts as
distinct from the Useful Arts which are for the sake of something else.
Fine Art, however, remains in the realm of Making and the
artist has the difficult task of selecting and arranging forms
in matter to apprehend the transcendental quality in beauty.
In.thts process he eliminates in many cases the irrevelant details of the visual appearances of things and exaggerates others
in order to construct the Vision of his aesthetic intuition.
This is always a trial for the artist as the earth bound forms
of the objects of nature defeat, by this very fact, the possibility of doing justice to the realm of the spirit.
9.

OPe

Cit., p. 162-163.

Unlike

those Who know the freedom in the joy of the contemplation of
Wisdom, the artist suffers the knowledge of the feebleness of
his means - matter subjected to certain rules of art.

This

furnishes a problem for the artist, for the rules are "the high
concealed ways by which Art itself. the working reason goes
to work, and every artist is well aware that if this intellectual form ceased to dominate his matter. his art would be a
mere sensual confusion." 10.
"The same technique may be given to the whole 001lection of these rules; but on condi tion of amplifYing considerably and elevating the ordinary
meaning of the word "technique." For it is a question not of material process only, but also. and
chiefly, of the ways and means of proceeding in the
intellectual sphere Which the artist uses to attain
the end of his art. Such ways are determined, like
paths laid out beiore through a tangled thicket.
But they have to be discovered. And the most closely
approximating to the individuality of the work spiritually conceived by the artist, art strictly personal to him and discoverable by one individual only."ll.
A work of art is thus ·oreative" and When a given result is obtained in "teohnique" as the result of disoovery it is the property of that work only, for to repeat it in the work of another
or in another work is to destroy it.
is oalled "aoademic art."

This is the oase in What

It is this trait of "individuality·

in the works of art whioh further alienate the artist from the
populaoe.

It sets him apart as someWhat queer because of a

failure to speak in the oonventional term with Whioh they are
oonversant.
10. op.

11.

Ope

But the nature of

it., p. 39.
oit., p. 176.

0

a

work of art sets the problem

for the artist and once he has found its solution there can be
no oompromise even though it make him the subject of misunderstandings.

!his problem also brings us to a discussion of Art

and Prudence.

In the light of our fuller understanding of the

demanding necessities in the production of a work of Pine Art,
it becomes evident that the artist oannot compromise the expression of his art in the interest of Prudence.

Art's only

obligation to the rightness of the thing expressed in keeping
with the demands of its 10gio.
"Art, therefore, keeping Making straight and not
Action, remains outside the line of human oonduct,
with an end, rules, and values, whioh are not
those of the man, but of the work to be produced.
!hat work is everything for art,--one law only
governs it--the exigencies and the good of the
. work." 12.
Skill is only a "material and extrinsio condition", as the
rightness of a work of art resides in the logic of the work in
the mind of the artist.
"Art operates for the good of the work done, !!
bonum operis. and everything Which diverts it
from that end adulterates and diminishes it." 13.
Because of the self-suffiCient and autocratio dominations of
the character of a work of art, beoause the rightness of a
work of art is in a manner of speaking non-mora1,_ there is
often a conflict in the mind of the artist between his Art
and Prudence.

Marltain suggests that the proper reoonci1iation

of this confliot can be brought about by a proper "humiliation"
• Ope cit., p. •
13. Ope cit., p. 14.

on the part of the artist to "make him as it were unconscious
of his art. or if the all-powerful unction of wisdom imbued
everything in him with the repose and peace of love.- 14.
Art, unlike Prudence, perfects the mind -Without presupposing
the correotness of the Will.-

In other words it is outslde the

moral sphere in one sense, since as a virtue, art cannot be
an evil.

this would be a contradiction.

Art as art never

makes a mistake.
~and therefore it ls not a necessity of art that
the artisan work well, but that he turn out good
work; there would, however, be a greater necesslty that the product of the art perform its function well, that a knife, e. g., should cut well,
and a saw, saw well, if the pecullarity of these
was to aot and not rather be passive, beoause they
have no control over their acts.- 15.

While "the 801e end of art is the work itself and its
beauty".--, for the man working, the work to be
done of itself comes into the line of morality
and so is merely a means. w 16.
While art is sovereign in its own field the artist as having
his destiny in Beatitude is subject to morality and therefore
his art is subject to a higher and, the final good of man.

In a Christian there is no conflict, because what would give
offense to man, as a Christian, and so in man himself, as a
Christian, is resolved the possible conflict between Art and
Prudence.
14.

15.
16.

0 p.

s.

OPe

cit., p. 15.

f •• I-II, q. 57, a. 5, ad. 1U$.
cit., p. 74.

"A work of art whioh is an offense to God offends him too, and having nothing left wherewith to give delight, at onoe loses in his
eyes all reason for being beautiful." 17.
-.aere the testimony of a poet who was sojealous an artist as Baudelaire is of the highest
interest. His essay on '!he Pagan BOhool',
vivldly desoriblng what an error it is for a
man to address himself to art as his supreme
end, oonoludes as follows: '!he unoontrolled
appetite for form impels the artist to mon.
strous, unknown disorders. Absorbed by the
fieroe passion for whatever is beautiful,
coml0, pretty or pioturesque, for there are
degrees, ldeas of What is right and true, disappear; the frenzied passion for art is a
oanoer whioh eats up everything else. And as
the definite absenoe of what is right and true
ln art is tantamount to the absence of art,
the man fades away oomplete~; excessive
speolallzation of a faoulty ends in nothlng.
loan understand the rage of the loonoolasts
and the Kohammedans against lmages. I admlt
all the reoourse of St. Augustine for the
overweening pleasure of the eyes. the danger
is so great that loan forgive the suppression
of the object. !he folly of art is on a par
with the abuse of the mind. !he oreation of
one or other of these two supremaoies begets stupidity, hardness of heart and unbounded pride
and egolsm.---" (Baudelaire, L'Art Romantique) 18.
!his matter of Art and Prudenoe is a highly important one as oan '
be inferred from the previous quotation from Baudelaire, and if
I might dlgress for a moment from the main topio of this Chapter, I would like to oall attention to its relation to praotioe in Art Eduoation.

!here is at the present moment of

writing quite a vogue for "self-expression" and

nb~eative

expression" ln art eauoation, as its most important product.
17. Opt oit., p. 76.

18. OPt olt., p. 218.

In the light of what has been previously said on the matter of
Art and Prudenoe it oan be easily seen that ·self-expression"
in art oan become a potential moral evil, not so much in the
nature of the kind of art produced, as in the fact that it is
likely to produce eXDessive individualism, in which a child is
taught to prize himself above any other good.

In this sense

then, the topic of Art and Prudence is a highly important
consideration in the discipline of "self-expression", which in
itself is not productive of evil, but is rather a necessary
expansion of the mind in the direction of perfecting the moral
end of human efforts.

!his sin of the isolation of art from

other values in life seems to be productive of another sin,
the sin of vanity, in Which the artist attempts to transcend
his earthly limitations by finding an abstraction in art forms
that will discount all reliance on human experience as a contingent charaoter of his expression, and makes his symbols of
such purity as to be the direct informers of the transoendental
sphere of existence.
Since the artist is also a man as well as an artist, and
as a man, Prudence, in the interest of his highest good, takes
precedence over any other kind of good.

And again, as a

Ohristian, the artist, by that very fact, will not conoeive a
good in the field of art which will not square with his highest
good.

In an age, however, which has lost in large measures

its disoi.pline of a Ohristian life, Art has assU$ed the

attitude of be1ng a law unto itself, and the oonf11ct of Art
and Prudence presents a real problem.

Even among the artists

of strong .integrity the line of demarcation between these two
interests has been d1fficult to find and even more difficult
to keep.
In summing up the Philosophy of Art of Jacques Maritain,
we can say that Art 1s:
1. Mak1ng in the Praotioal Order.
2. Conditioned only by the good of the work
itself and therefore outside the sphere
of morality as a work of Art.
3. Art is however subject to Prudence by the
fact that while art is its own justification
the artist as man is subject to the higher
demands of Korality.
4. That there are two kinds of Art
a. Useful - for the sake of something else
b.

~ine

- for its own sake

Fine art differs from Useful art inasmuch as
.ine art possesses Beauty which is an end in
itself.
Beauty is that whioh gives pleasure on sight
and is a kind of good which is known by a
kind of "Intuition."

!his "Intuition" i8 an

intellectual grasp of the vision of truth as

..

-

a knowledge of the splendor in truth not of
truth.

-

!o create this beauty the artist se-

lects and arranges the forms of Visual appearances of things to conform to his ae.
sthetic peroeption.

!his is a process of !!-

straotion, which must however not deny the
sense experienoe of things
part.

of which it is a

Beauty is a kind of supernatural light

oast on things apart from their individual
existence, but none the less, attached to them.
Beauty is a transcendental Which delights the
mind because it possesses
1. Integrity, because the mind likes being.
2. Proportion, because the mind likes order
and unity.
3. Clarity. because the mind likes intelligibility.
the rules of Art are the proper ordering in the
mind of the conditions necessary to attain the
end of a work of art.

They are the individual

discovery of the artist as dictated by the
needs of the work of art.

They are inflexible

and in.vi table.
5.

lastly, Art is a necessary good because it perfects a habit of the mind, and as such it perfects man in the direction of his final end 1n
Beat1 tude.

CHAPTBR 5

!HI THINGS THEY HAVE IIi COMilOli

It may seem strange, that two theories of art, one based on a
philosophY Wholly within nature, and one which includes a dest1nJ beyond nature, oould have much in common.

But owing to the

faot, that art as a human achievement, has a very unique and
distinct character of its own, it 1s possible to recognize very
definite traits, irrespeotive of how these traits may be accounted for.

.or instance, both theories agree that;

1. Art is a creation, and not an imitation of nature.

2. Oreation involves the process of abstracting.
3. It neoessitates "Intuition" in its production.

Al-

though the oharacter of it would be described differently in the two theories, yet in both of them, it
has a certain "gratuitous" quality.
4. It has

~orm"t

although the definitions of it would

be slightly different in the two philosophies.
5. It is Intelleotual, but is not "!ruth" as such.
6. It has an Individuality whioh is infallible in char.
acter, being governed only by the needs of the ocoasion.
7. It produces
8.

S~ll

~elight."

is extrinsio to • work of Art.

9. technique is a process of organizing the means toward
the end.
10. "Academic Art" is mere repetition of an original path

of discovery in Art.
11. It is a means of enlarging the intellectual horizon
of man.
This is quite a respectable list of oommon factors, for two suoh
divergent philosophies to have.

Among other things it indioates

the distinotive and observable nature of Art.

~or

in spite of

the natural oonflict of these two opposing philosophies, it
has largely sucoeeded in maintaining an independent reality of
its ?wn, however the destiny of man may be conceived.

CHAPTER 6
III WHAT

T~Y

DIFFER

!he two theories of art differ, as one would expect, in those
points whioh are the immediate oonsequences of the two basio
theories of philosophy on whioh their explanation of Art re.ts.
1.

.or John Dewey, Art is a quality that permeates "experience"

and is wholly within nature, while fO.r Jacque. Karitain, it is
a vision of the truth in its transoendenta1 oharacter Which is
apprehended by and through the sensible.

In this matter we

have the most striking difference between the•• two theories of
Art, because it reflects the most important divergence between
the two basic philosophies on which the art theories rest.
2.

!here is also a possible disagreement about the distinction.

of .1ne and Useful Arts.
d1st1nction.

Dewey finds no cause for making such

If a thing is merely useful, it is because it

fails in its perfection as an "experience."

Ever" "experienoe"

that is oomplete, whether it involves an objeot of use, or
otherwise, is esthetic if it is a oomplete "experience."
Mar1ta1n, on the other hand, divides art into two kinda, Useful and .ine.

!he Useful Arts being those whioh are done for

the· sake of something else, while Fine Art is something made
for its own sake.
As I pointed out in a previous ohapter, I think that it is
possible to say, that in Karitain's.philosophy, the useful

ob~ect

could have a Pine Art aspeot.

For besides being made

.

to serve a use, the objeot might also be oonsidered as possessing a .perfection of design whioh could oonstitute an interest in itself. (fine art).

This interest would not nec-

essarily detraot in any way from its perfeotion as an objeot
of use.

It would· simply be s more imaginative treatment of the

object •
• 01' .aritain, the element whioh gives the oharaoter of
.ine Art to Art, is "Beauty", whioh is a "kind of splendor
shining on matter."

Dewey, on the other hand, mentions Beauty,

as being only the description of an operation for Whioh
another term would be better, sinoe the word Beauty has too
many mystioal oonnotations attaohed to it.

He

woul~

prefer to

speak of Beauty s.imply as "Art in experienoe."
Art and Prudenoe also present a problem to be resolved,
as Art, whioh has no responsibility outs1de of the good of the
work made, may use as its subjeot-matter 80mething whioh might
be in oonfliot with the moral good of man.

~rita1n

solves

the diffioulty, by p01nting out the impossibility of suoh a
oonfliot in an artist who 1s also a Christian, sinoe a les8er
good (Art) oannot take preoedence over the greater good in
the life of man (Beautitude).

What would give offense to God

in a work of Art would neoessarily give offense to the artist,
as a Christ1an.

Dewey does not speak speo1f1oally of th1s pro-

blem, exoept to 1nfer that an offense in this matter implies

imperfectionln "experience,· and therefore oould not be an
acoeptable resolution of a problem.
2.

IntuitIon haa been previously spoken of as an element Which

the two theories have in oommon, subject to oertain reservations.

!he common element in this situation was mentioned as

having a oertain "gratuitous" quality.

!his means that in

both oases intuition is not the produot of an obvious effort of
thought, but that it enters the scene as something in the nature of a gift.

Dewey, however, qualifies this by his re-

lianoe on the funded meaning of our previous "experiences"
While Maritain postulates it as a gift on under stand ins. using
this word as it has been defined in Chapter 2.
4.

!hey both speak of "delight" as one of the products of a

work of Art, but again with a certain difference very similar
to the one described in the preceding paragraph.
the differences whioh have been listed in this chapter
are irreooncilable as they are the immediate consequences of
the two basioally different philosophies.

CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSIONS
Slnce Doth of the theories of

~rt,

which have been pre-

sented in the pages of this thesis are logically correct in
themselves, final justification of them must be looked for in
the basic philosophical foundation on Which they rest.

This

means weighing the merits of John Dewey's theory of Instrumentalism, with the Sbholasticism of Jacques Daritain.

They are

opposing points of view in Philosophy and they can't both be
right.

Btlenne Gilson in his book "The Unity of Philosophlcal

Bxperiencs", page 293, defines the basic philosophy of William
i

James by these words:
~l11ism James was elaborating a pragmatic conception of knowledge, where ideas were not true, but
became true in proportion to their practical verification. "

This description wlll also serve to define John Dewey's position
in philosophy and his theory of art, which rests for its validity
on this phi 10 sopq , will have to share in t.he fortunes which
crlticism can level agalnst this philosophical point of view.
If John Dewey's fundamental philosophy' of "lIxperianoe" is

.

found wanting, the same fata automatically attaches itself to
hls'theory of art in so far as it is directly affected by it.
Thls task of evaluation is not a simple one and could
easily become the sUQject of another independent pleoe of researoh.

Sinee, however, it falls partly within the soope of

thl. »erformance to say something about this problem, it may be
well to sketoh one of the important feature. of suoh a orltioism, as a 'basis for deciding the relative merits of the two
art theories of this thesis.
the ohief oritioism that oan be leveled against John Dewey'
philosop~

aeality.

of experience, is that it does not include all of

Bo matter how satisfaotori1y one makes the explanation

for a part of Reality, it can never stand by itself alone.

At

best, it can only' be a fool's paradise, for that part of Reality
whioh it denies or neg1eots, will be its undoing; for the mind
of man is so oonstituted, that 1t will not be satisfied with
partial answerB.

-bY his very nature man is a metaphysioa1 animal.- 1.
reason demands some answer to the questions
-that are forced upon him ooncerning the meaning and
purpose of life; henoe, PhilosopbT ariaes as an attempt to answer the questions by going baok to the
ultimate oauses of things. Philosophy oannot giva
man the assurance that ravealed religion oan; out,
whereas religion gives only the facts regarding the
meaning and purpose of life, Phi10sophr tries to ex»lain them. £mong the divisions of Philosop~,
Ketaphysics is that part whioh goes beyond all the
material conditions of reality, by abstraoting from
them, and derives from being-as-suoh the truth of
Ketaphysios. then, will depend the reliability of
all Philosophy. Soholastio KetaplV'sios i8 founded
on Aristotle at interpreted by the thinkers of the
)(idd1e Agas.- •

~'a

1. Gilson; !he Unity of the Philosophioal Bxperience, p. 307.
2. IloOormiok; Scholastio lIetapb.y8ics, Book
It P. 14 •
.......
~"-.-'-~

.lside from Dew.,.'. statement that W8 can know only those things
whioh we oaD oontrol in overt aotion, he seems to find it a
matter of further proof, that a concern with reality beyond nature. is beyond the reaoh of manls knowledge beoause of the
endless oonfusion and confliot Which suoh an effort has produoed.

It does not S8em to occur to him that this confliot

might onlY' be evidence of the difficulty of the problem, not ita
impossibility.
"If such is the ultimate teachings of philosophical
e%perieDOe, the spectaole of so man, blunders. ending
invariably in the same sceptioism, is more suggestive
of hope than discouragement. 'ar from being a soienoe
long sinoe exhausted, metap~sics is a soience which
has as yet, been tried by but few. What passed by
its name was almost always something else, and it is
better that we know it; that is, if we are to realize
that misadventures whioh regularly befall that something else are wholly' unrelated to the true nature
ot metaphysios." 3.
!he most important part of reality whioh John De.eY' exoludes
from his philosophy is Wthe final oause. w He will admit of
nothing except that whioh is within nature and he resolves the
explanation of all happenings in these terma.

the difficulty

of this position is outlined in the following quotations:
W!he existence of final causes is denied or ignored
iy all .eohanistio philosophy. that is. by all philosophy that attempts to explain reality in terms of
mere matter and force. .inal oausality is not oapable of measurement in mechanical units. Its equivalent oannot be found in energy expended or in
work done. Yet to omit final causality from our
account of reality is to leave an important side of
reality unexplained. Bfficient causes aoting on
3. Gilson; Op. Cit., p. 318.

matter (the orlgln of which Meohanistl0 phi1osoPh7 doe. not and cannot exp1aln) can alter
matter and be a sufficient reason for the exlstence of new combinations of matter. But reallty is more than oombinatlons of matter and
energy. In the course of the changes that take
place in nature, single beings arrive at the perfection that is suitable to them and in achieving
thls perfectlon they work out the order of the
unlverse. Ungulded oauses cannot acoount for 8uch
results. Unless the result aohieved was foreseen
and lntended, we should be compelled to oall it
acoidental; but what is accidental cannot be the
regular and uniform effect of the worklng of a
oaU8e. Therefore the foreseeing and lntendlng of
an end ls necessary for the explanation of reality."4.
hrther analysis of the philosophy of John Dewey would reveal
m&n7 other diffioulties of his position, but for the purpose
of this thesis, thi8 basio failure to aooount for all of Reality will have to suffice for the oonclusion, that his theory
of £rt cannot merit the approval that can be given to that of
Karitain's Whose basic philosophy essays the interpretation of
the sensible world in terms of the total Reality.
John De.8y'8 theory of Art, aside from its earthbound
limitations, is a very complete and intriguing account of this
subject.

It is a well integrated explanation of all the con-

ditions attending a work of Art and aside from the neces8ity
of placing it wholly with nature, with its attending conaequences, it bears a close resemblance to the theory of Jaoque.
Karitain.

I find John Dewey's position regarding the

~ine

and

Useful Arts, especially important for the reasons which were
given ln Ohapter 3.

All ln all, his theory of art, ln all the

4. IOCormlok. Ope Clt., p. 157.

ramlfloationa that hls explanatlon of it takes, ls a very 11luminatlng and scholarly approaoh to the problem.

It also has

the merlts of a simple and direct account, of a field whioh has
c

suffered much at the hand of many phllosophers who have shrouded
their explanations of lt in a nebulous fog of pseudo-mystical
qualities which totally unfits it as a possibility in everyday
living.

!hey praotically deny lts benefits to all but a se-

leot few who have the leisure and the peculiaI' propensitles to
understand and enjoy it.

In this world of esthetio nonsense,

John Dewey's polnt of view ls a welcome breath of freSh air.
As has been stated before, John Dewey's theory of art
suffers in explanation but not as much ln operation, except
perhaps in regard to

Pr~dence.

In Maritain'. theory. the

higher good of man, as present in the conscience of a Christian,
would prevent the pitfalls of evil in art.

In the art theory

of John Dewey evil productions in art are subject only to the
control of the ideals of man as founded in nature.

As the dis-

cipline is entirely dependent on the moral strength and integrity of the individual, it will suffer the limitations of
I

human strength.

Rven in those of noble stature, in character,

the limitations in moral strength of earth born forms will not
prove sufficient to guide and direct the destiu, of this noble
form of human expression.
·Created good is not less than that good of which
man is oapable, as of something intrinsio and Inherent to hlm; but lt is less than the good for

Which he is capable, as of an object. and which
i& infinity." 1.
~Sinoe ever" oreature is subject to the laws of
nature, from the very faot that its power and
action are limited; that Whioh surpasaes oreated
nature cannot be done by the power of any creature." 2.

It is for this reason that Maritain's theory of art in its noble
simplioity and fullness of value must be oonsidered superior.

1. S. !., I-II. q. 2, a. 5.
2. S. !., I-II. q. 5. a. 7.
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